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Introduction
Universal health coverage (UHC) means that all people can 
access health services of good quality without experiencing 
financial hardship, with the objectives of equitable access in 
line with their needs, and financial protection and fair financ-
ing. The way that resources are raised, pooled and used to 
purchase health services determines whether resources are 
available at the point of need. Health financing is therefore 
key to achieving the objectives of UHC. Yet many countries 
struggle to progress towards UHC due to numerous deficits in 
raising revenue, pooling funds and purchasing health services. 
While these three health financing functions are strongly re-
lated, this article focuses on the function of pooling.
Pooling is the accumulation and management of prepaid 
financial resources on behalf of some or all of the population. 
Out-of-pocket payments are non-prepaid, unpooled funds 
and thus work against the objectives of UHC.1 Pooling is an 
enabling function, creating opportunities for efficient redis-
tribution of resources to support equitable access to needed 
services, with financial protection from any given level of 
prepaid funding. However, pooling is fragmented in many 
countries, which creates barriers to redistribution and results 
in inefficiencies.1–3 A key policy question then is how a country 
can reform its pooling arrangements to increase redistribu-
tion at the system level and across different pools so there is 
progress towards UHC.
There has been a lack of conceptual work on this subject 
in the literature since publication of the World Health Report 
2010.1 Readers can consult other sources for a review of pool-
ing reforms in former communist countries4 and for a typology 
of pooling arrangements.3 However, we have not identified any 
global overview or discussion of pooling reforms from a system 
perspective. This gap may be due to insufficient recognition 
that pooling is a distinct health financing policy instrument 
that can improve financial protection and equitable access 
to health care, even if additional revenues cannot be raised.
In this article we provide an overview of various options 
for pooling reforms and assess their potential to increase 
countries’ capacity to redistribute resources equitably. The aim 
is to support countries in exploring their pooling options for 
UHC. We based the article on a review of country experiences 
in the published and grey literature using the terms “pooling 
reforms” and “fragmentation in pooling” in a search of the 
online databases PubMed® and Google Scholar. We supple-
mented the literature review with insights and information 
gathered from our policy advisory and technical work on 
health financing in countries around the world.
Objectives of pooling
Pooling serves to spread the financial risk associated with the 
need to use and pay for health services, so that this risk is not 
fully borne by an individual who falls ill; this is often referred 
to as risk pooling.5 Importantly, risk pooling can be achieved 
by more than just health insurance, and there are many ways 
to structure pooling.1,3
Redistributive capacity refers to the potential to redis-
tribute funds from individuals with lower health needs and 
lower health risks to individuals with higher health need 
and risks (health risks meaning the risk of incurring health 
expenditure). The central objective of pooling is to maximize 
a Department of Health Systems Governance and Financing, World Health Organization, avenue Appia 20, 1211 Geneva 27, Switzerland.
b World Health Organization Regional Office for South-East Asia, New Delhi, India.
c World Health Organization Barcelona Office for Health Systems Strengthening, Barcelona, Spain.
d Department of Global Health and Development, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London, England.
Correspondence to Inke Mathauer (email: mathaueri@who.int).
(Submitted: 27 June 2019 – Revised version received: 18 November 2019 – Accepted: 18 November 2019 – Published online: 29 November 2019 )
Pooling financial resources for universal health coverage: options for 
reform
Inke Mathauer,a Lluis Vinyals Torres,b Joseph Kutzin,a Melitta Jakabc & Kara Hansond
Abstract Universal health coverage (UHC) means that all people can access health services of good quality without experiencing financial 
hardship. Three health financing functions – revenue raising, pooling of funds and purchasing health services – are vital for UHC. This article 
focuses on pooling: the accumulation and management of prepaid financial resources. Pooling creates opportunities for redistribution of 
resources to support equitable access to needed services and greater financial protection even if additional revenues for UHC cannot be 
raised. However, in many countries pooling arrangements are very fragmented, which create barriers to redistribution. The purpose of this 
article is to provide an overview of pooling reform options to support countries who are exploring ways to enhance redistribution of funds. 
We outline four broad types of pooling reforms and discuss their potential and challenges in addressing fragmentation of health financing: 
(i) shifting to compulsory or automatic coverage for everybody; (ii) merging different pools to increase the number of pool members 
and the diversity of pool members’ health needs and risks; (iii) cross-subsidization of pools that have members with lower revenues and 
higher health risks; and (iv) harmonization across pools, such as benefits, payment methods and rates. Countries can combine several 
reform elements. Whether the potential for redistribution is actually realized through a pooling reform also depends on the alignment of 
the pooling structure with revenue raising and purchasing arrangements. Finally, the scope for reform is constrained by institutional and 
political feasibility, and the political economy around pooling reforms needs to be anticipated and managed.
133Bull World Health Organ 2020;98:132–139| doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.2471/BLT.19.234153
Policy & practice
Pooling reforms for universal health coverageInke Mathauer et al.
redistributive capacity by de-linking 
contributions, such as taxes or insur-
ance premiums, from a person’s health 
status or health risks.1,6 To achieve these 
objectives, desirable attributes of a pool 
of health funds and health risks are size 
(in terms of the number of people in 
the pool) and diversity (of health risks 
within the pool). An important feature 
of any pool is compulsory or automatic 
coverage to increase pool size and diver-
sity.1 Otherwise the problem of adverse 
selection may arise, that is, the tendency 
for individuals with greater health needs 
to join a voluntary scheme, leading to an 
imbalance of risks in that pool and lim-
ited ability to share risks across people 
with different health needs.7 In the case 
of multiple pools, the average per capita 
expenditure on health, adjusted for the 
pool members’ health risks, should be 
equal or similar across pools.
When pooling arrangements are 
fragmented, however, redistributive 
capacity becomes limited. Fragmented 
pooling is characterized by differences 
in people’s health risks across pools, 
such that the pools with higher health 
risks need more resources for their pool 
members to get the services they need. 
If not matched by greater revenue, this 
fragmentation can lead to coverage 
gaps, inequitable access to services and 
lower financial protection. Fragmented 
pooling also contributes to health sys-
tem inefficiencies, due to duplication of 
tasks, resulting in higher health system 
administration costs overall.2,6
Pooling reform options
In this section we outline four principle 
ways of reforming pooling arrange-
ments. These strategies are not mutually 
exclusive, and countries can combine 
several elements of them. Fig. 1 provides 
a visualization of the pooling options, 
while Table 1 summarizes their features 
and effects.
Making coverage compulsory or 
automatic
Whatever the pooling structure, a 
fundamental requirement for increas-
ing a country’s redistributive capac-
ity is to make coverage compulsory 
or automatic.1 Compulsory coverage 
goes together with contributory-based 
entitlement; that is, there must be a 
specific contribution by or on behalf of 
the covered person. Automatic coverage 
means that a person is covered based 
on her residence or citizenship.8 When 
coverage is compulsory or automatic 
for all population groups, the pool size 
increases and the pool(s) have a more 
diverse mix of health risks among their 
members, since people at all levels of 
health risk (high and low) are covered.
Some low- and middle-income 
countries have introduced contribu-
tory compulsory coverage for people in 
the informal economy. These countries 
manage to enforce this because contri-
butions are highly subsidized by govern-
ment funding. Thus, all or a large part 
of the population has the same coverage, 
with some population groups being fully 
subsidized, as is the case in Chile, Mon-
golia and Rwanda, for example.9–11 In 
other countries, such as Ghana and Viet 
Nam12,13 there remains a missing middle 
segment of people who are outside the 
formal sector, but not considered as poor 
or vulnerable, and are hence ineligible 
for fully subsidized schemes. In this 
case, even when enrolment is officially 
Fig. 1. Illustration of pooling reforms for universal health coverage
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mandatory, enforcing it is difficult, and 
this missing middle group may not enrol 
in the contributory scheme, even if con-
tributions are partially subsidized.14–16 
Gaps in automatic or compulsory 
coverage mean that population groups 
who are not covered are likely to have 
higher out-of-pocket expenditure, with 
the ensuing financial burden resulting 
in lower use of services.12,17
In summary, merely introducing 
compulsory or automatic coverage can 
be both unfeasible and insufficient on 
its own, as it needs to be accompanied 
by subsidies for those who cannot con-
tribute, as discussed below.
Merging pools
One direct way of reducing fragmenta-
tion in health financing systems is to 
decrease the number of pools through 
merging them. This increases the pool 
size and the diversity of health risks of 
the pool(s), thus enhancing redistribu-
tive capacity. Moreover, the merging 
of pools reduces administrative costs 
because duplication of tasks is reduced. 
Merging may also enhance the purchas-
ing power of the pool and hence the 
potential to purchase health services 
more strategically for gains in efficiency 
and equity.2 Merging can be a solution to 
various forms of fragmentation.
First, merging can be appropriate 
when there are too many territorially-
based health pools. For example, there 
may be a pool for each province under 
general tax financing arrangements 
where the government administration 
is decentralized. Merging can occur as 
part of broader reforms that go beyond 
the health sector, such as public admin-
istration and recentralization reforms. 
A successful example of such a territo-
rial merger reform is Denmark, which 
reduced the number of administrative 
regions from 14 to 5 and of munici-
palities from 271 to 98, and in doing so 
lowered the number of health financ-
ing pools. This reform helped increase 
redistributive capacity, strengthen the 
purchasing power of the pools and 
save administrative costs.18 In other 
instances, decentralized funds and pools 
for the health sector only are merged. 
For example, Ukraine reversed previous 
budget allocations to lower government 
levels and instead established a general 
tax-funded national pooling and pur-
chasing agency.4
Second, merging may help in such 
decentralized health-care systems where 
there is an additional layer of fragmenta-
tion due to territorial overlap of pools. 
This fragmentation happens when lower 
levels of government pool and allocate 
resources to their health-care facilities in 
their own area, such as district govern-
ments to district facilities, and regional 
governments to regional facilities. In 
this setup, pooling, purchasing and 
service provision is vertically integrated, 
and in principle, there are distinctions 
in the level of health services to be pro-
vided by different levels of facilities. In 
practice, however, there are overlaps, 
since districts exist within regions or 
provinces. Overlapping pools can lead 
to duplication of infrastructure and 
inefficient networks for health-service 
delivery. This issue is particularly evi-
dent in provincial capitals, as the pro-
vincially funded facilities also provide 
lower-level services. Not only does this 
duplication affect efficiency directly, 
but it also reduces redistributive capac-
ity for a given level of available funds.4 
Various countries, such as Kyrgyzstan, 
the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine4,19 
have addressed this fragmentation and 
overlap issue through vertical merging; 
that is, elevating the level of pooling to 
higher levels of government. However, 
this type of pooling reform also implies 
introducing changes to the service de-
livery organization and public financial 
management rules.
Third, pools characterised by popu-
lation segmentation can be merged. As 
an explicit policy instrument, this is 
particularly relevant for many low- and 
middle-income countries. Such hori-
zontal merging can be applied to two or 
more health coverage schemes, particu-
larly when characterized by population 
segmentation. Several countries have 
taken an explicit policy decision to 
merge different schemes for different 
population groups. As such a (previ-
ously separate) subsidized scheme for 
lower income and vulnerable people, 
who tend to have higher health risks, 
is combined and integrated with a 
larger existing scheme for contributory 
members. Instead of calling it merging, 
policy-makers may also refer to this as 
adding or integrating new population 
groups into the existing (contributory) 
scheme. Either way, this change usually 
implies a diversification of the sources of 
funds to be pooled because (additional) 
budget transfers are required to fund 
coverage for those unable to contribute. 
The aim is to provide the same benefit 
package for everyone.
Better-off population groups may 
oppose the merging of pools for fear of 
having to cross-subsidize poorer groups. 
Nonetheless, several countries have 
managed to introduce such reforms, in-
cluding Indonesia (2014),20 the Republic 
of Korea (2003),21 Turkey (2012)22 and 
Viet Nam (2001).23 In all countries, the 
merging of pools significantly increased 
the risk diversity in the merged pool 
and was the starting point for reducing 
inequities in access to health services. 
In practice, merging of pools and funds 
can also lead to undesirable effects and 
increase inequities. In some instances, 
state budget transfers to finance the 
Table 1. Pooling reforms for universal health coverage: effects and requirements
Type of pooling reform Effects on the pooling structure Effects on pooling objectives Requirements
Making coverage compulsory or 
automatic
Increases size and diversity of pool Improves redistributive capacity and 
efficiency
If contributory: 
subsidization of those 
people unable to 
contribute
Merging pools Increases size and diversity of pool Improves redistributive capacity and 
efficiency
Cross-subsidization Maintains the pooling structure Attempts to equalize available per capita 
funds across pools
Harmonization across pools Maintains the pooling structure Aligns pool operations and attempts to 
equalize benefits and conditions at the 
point-of-service use
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coverage of poor and vulnerable popula-
tion groups did not benefit these groups, 
but instead cross-subsidized better-off 
groups.24 This outcome is because the 
better-off groups use health-care ser-
vices more, and use more expensive 
services, benefiting from better service 
availability and geographical access in 
urban and higher-income areas. While 
such a merger leads to a higher level of 
risk sharing, it does not automatically 
lead to increased spending on the poorer 
population group. The merger may per-
petuate pro-rich spending, particularly 
when purchasing arrangements under-
mine the redistributive capacity created 
by the pooling arrangement, as has been 
the case in Indonesia and Viet Nam for 
example.20,23
Cross-subsidization
When there are multiple pools, an 
alternative to merging is explicit cross-
subsidization through risk adjustment; 
that is, adjusting pool funding accord-
ing to the members’ health needs and 
risks. This option retains the number 
and structure of multiple pools, and 
instead redistributes funds with the 
aim of reaching equal per capita average 
revenues across pools, adjusted for pool 
members’ health risks. There are vari-
ous approaches to adjustment, but com-
mon to all of them is that a central pool, 
or a central-level fund holder, exists or 
is created in a virtual account. Funds 
from this central pool are allocated 
among pools, such as territorially dis-
tinct health funding pools, based on an 
allocation formula.1 This mechanism 
is used in numerous countries with a 
decentralized system, such as Spain 
and England in the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 
In these countries, average per capita 
spending, when risk-adjusted, is similar 
across the different territories.25,26 The 
adjustment mechanism may be applied 
jointly for several sectors, not only for 
health.1 Likewise, funds can flow from 
the central or virtual pool to different 
health coverage schemes characterized 
by population segmentation, as is the 
case in Japan,27 or to competing health 
insurance funds, such as in Czechia, 
Germany and Switzerland.4,28,29 In 
fact, it is only through risk adjustment 
that competition among health insur-
ance funds, and hence patient choice 
of pools, can be realized, as well as a 
benefit package that is the same for all 
across pools.
Adjustment for the pool members’ 
health risks is typically based on assess-
ing the relative health risks of members 
in that pool, using criteria such as age 
and sex, employment status, disability 
and morbidity as well as poverty levels 
of a region.30 The allocation formula can 
also consider the revenue-raising capaci-
ty of the different pools. Risk adjustment 
enhances redistribution of funds, but it 
creates an extra administrative burden 
compared with having a single pool, 
potentially leading to higher administra-
tive costs. Risk adjustment also requires 
data and an effective information man-
agement system. Nonetheless, in some 
contexts, introducing risk adjustment 
mechanisms may be politically more ac-
ceptable than merging pools, especially 
when the political autonomy of different 
territories is critical, such as in Spain. 
Moreover, risk adjustment on its own 
is not enough. Aligning and adjusting 
the operation and design features of the 
different pools is also needed, so that 
they operate in a uniform or at least 
similar way.
Another form of cross-subsidi-
zation is to introduce and subsidize a 
new pool, especially when setting up 
a unified pool for different population 
groups is unfeasible. The idea is to create 
an explicit non-contributory coverage 
scheme for people outside the formal 
sector. Redistribution is achieved by 
providing budget transfers and gradu-
ally increasing these, with the ultimate 
aim of achieving equitable access to 
health services and harmonized benefit 
packages. Countries that have pursued 
this pooling reform option include for 
example Colombia,31 Gabon,32 Mexico,33 
Peru6 and Thailand.34 In these countries, 
reforms have substantially reduced the 
differences in per capita expenditure 
between different population groups, 
and thus helped to improve financial 
protection and equitable access to health 
services. To be effective, a new scheme 
for non-contributory population groups 
must introduce automatic coverage, 
whereby all people outside employ-
ment in the formal sector are covered, 
although this automatic coverage has 
not been the case in all countries using 
this reform approach.
Harmonization across pools
The objectives of pooling can also be 
achieved through policy instruments 
that go beyond the realm of pooling. 
Such reform efforts can focus on har-
monization across pools, which can be 
considered an as-if-pooling mechanism. 
Key areas for harmonization and stan-
dardization include the benefit package, 
contracting arrangements, provider 
payment mechanisms and remuneration 
rates, as well as information manage-
ment systems. For example, in Colom-
bia, benefits were effectively harmonized 
for the contributory and subsidized 
schemes, although this reform took 
several years,31 since this requires the 
same (health-risk adjusted) per capita 
level of funding. Such harmonization 
attempts are also currently underway in 
India,35 in addition to its core reform of 
providing budget transfers to a separate 
coverage scheme for the poor.
Policy issues and lessons
Reforming the way in which funds for 
health are pooled primarily addresses 
the structure and nature of pooling and 
is essential for enhanced redistribu-
tive capacity. When participation in a 
health coverage scheme is contributory, 
subsidization will be needed for certain 
population groups. In determining 
which pooling reform option is appro-
priate, countries need to be clear about 
the multiple causes of fragmentation 
in their financing system and use this 
understanding to define their reform 
goals and directions.
Whether the potential of pooling 
reforms is actually realized will also 
depend on alignment of the pooling 
structure with the other health financ-
ing functions of revenue raising and 
purchasing. Revenue-raising policies 
determine the prepaid share of health 
expenditure and whether funds are 
raised equitably. Likewise, redistribu-
tion only succeeds through appropriate 
arrangements for purchasing health 
services to achieve efficiency, equity and 
financial protection objectives. These 
arrangements include setting suitable 
and coherent incentives for providers 
to deliver quality health-care services.36 
Importantly, provider payment methods 
and amounts of payments to health-
care providers should be the same for 
all members of the pool, independent 
of whether people pay direct contribu-
tions or not.
Misalignment of pooling and pur-
chasing arrangements is also common in 
universal tax-funded systems in which 
the health budget is the dominant pool-
ing arrangement. Misalignment may 
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happen when the budget is allocated 
to providers based on historically set 
budget lines that are determined by an 
input logic, that is, how much inputs 
(such as staff, medicines and supplies) 
are needed (rather than paying for the 
output, such as services provided or pa-
tient cases treated).37 Budget allocations 
for vertical disease programmes may 
also result in misalignment. Addressing 
these shortcomings will be an important 
step towards realizing the potential of a 
health budget as a unified pool. More-
over, pooling reforms may also require 
changes in public financial management 
procedures, including how budgets are 
formulated and implemented.
In many countries, the source of 
funds for health is still associated with a 
pooling arrangement. However, there is 
no inherent link between how resources 
are raised and how they should be 
pooled. Diverse sources of revenues can 
be combined in a pool before these funds 
are passed on to providers. Therefore, 
delinking sources of funds from pooling 
options is important. 
The question has been raised 
whether non-contributory coverage 
for those outside the formal sector 
could encourage informalization of the 
labour force, that is, an increase in the 
share of people working in the informal 
economy. Evidence is scarce and mixed. 
For example, the effect of Mexico’s 
reforms was marginal; the proportion 
of the population in the formal sector 
decreased by 0.4–0.7 percentage points 
within a few years of the programme’s 
introduction.38 In contrast, in Thailand 
informal-sector employment increased 
by two percentage points in the year of 
adopting universal coverage and just 
under 10 percentage points after three 
years.39 However, people need access to 
health services and financial protection 
immediately. The objective of UHC can-
not be traded against the need to expand 
formal employment, which requires 
other policy instruments and is a long-
term economic policy goal.
Finally, as changes in pooling ar-
rangements are about redistribution of 
funds, it is important to recognize that 
there may be institutional and politi-
cal constraints on the scope for action 
to reduce fragmentation in a health 
financing system or to mitigate its con-
sequences. Reform requires the time 
and institutional capacity to implement 
it, as well as the approval of decision-
makers and involved stakeholders. 
Clearly, pooling reforms go beyond the 
realm of health ministries and require 
strong support from other government 
agencies. Despite the complexities of 
political economy, we urge countries to 
undertake pooling reforms.
In conclusion, a variety of pooling 
reform options are available to enhance 
redistribution of resources for health. 
For such reforms to realize their poten-
tial, however, they must be set within 
an overall vision of health financing 
that aligns pooling with other health 
financing functions. ■
Competing interests: None declared.
摘要
统筹资金实现全民健康覆盖：改革方案
全民健康覆盖 (UHC)  意味着所有人都可以享受优质
医疗服务，同时不会遇到财务困难。三项医疗融资职
能——提高收入、统筹资金和购买医疗服务——对
于 UHC 至关重要。本文着重于统筹 ：积累和管理预
付资金。统筹能够创造资源再分配的机会，有助于人
人都能公平地享有所需的服务并且得到更大的财务保
障。即使无法为 UHC 增加收入，依然会有保障。然
而，在许多国家中，统筹安排非常分散，从而对再分
配造成阻碍。本文的目的旨在简要概述统筹改革方案，
以支持正在探索加强资金再分配方法的国家。我们概
述四种类型的统筹改革并讨论其潜力以及在解决医疗
融资分散问题时遇到的挑战 ：(i) 转为强制性或自主性
全民覆盖 ；(ii)  合并不同的统筹方案以增加参保会员
人数，同时提升参保会员的医疗需求和风险多样性 ；
(iii) 对于收入较低和健康风险较高的会员参加的统筹
方案进行交叉补贴；(iv) 协调各种统筹方案，例如福利、
صخلم
حلاصلإل تارايخ :ةلماشلا ةيحصلا ةيطغتلل ةيلالما دراولما عيمتج
 عيملج  نكمي  هنأ  (UHC)  ةلماشلا  ةيحصلا  ةيطغتلا  ينعت
 ةديلجا  ةدولجا  تاذ  ةيحصلا  تامدلخا  لىع  لوصلحا  صاخشلأا
 ،يحصلا ليومتلل فئاظو ثلاث كانه .ةيلام تامزأ ةهجاوم نود
 عجم يهو لاأ ،ةلماشلا  ةيحصلا  ةيطغتلل  ةيويلحا بناولجا نم دعت
 اذه زكري .ةيحصلا تامدلخا ءاشرو ،لاوملأا عيمتجو ،تاداريلإا
 ًامدقم ةعوفدلما ةيلالما دراولما عيمتج ينعي وهو :عيمجتلا لىع لاقلما
 دراولما  عيزوت  ةداعلإ  صرف  قلخ  لىإ  عيمجتلا  يدؤيو  .اتهرادإو
 عم  ،لداع  لكشب  ةبولطلما  تامدلخا  لىع  لوصلحا  ةيناكمإ  معدل
 ةيفاضإ  تاداريإ  عجم  ناكملإاب  نكي  لم  ول  ىتح  بركأ  ةيلام  ةياحم
 نادلبلا  نم  ديدعلا  في  هنإف  ،كلذ  عمو  .ةلماشلا  ةيحصلا  ةيطغتلل
 زجاوح قللخ يدؤي ام وهو ،ةياغلل ةأزمج عيمجتلا تابيترت نوكت
 ةرظن ميدقت وه لاقلما اذه نم ضرغلا .عيزوتلا ةداعإ ةهجاوم في
 يتلا نادلبلا معد فدبه ،عيمجتلا في حلاصلإا تارايخ لوح ةماع
 ةعبرأ حضون فوس .لاوملأا عيزوت ةداعإ ينسحتل ًاقرط فشكتست
 تايدحتلاو  اتهايناكمإ  شقاننو  ،عيمجتلا  حلاصلإ  ةماع  عاونأ
 لىإ  لوحتلا  (1)  :يحصلا  ليومتلا  ةئزتج  عم  لماعتلا  هجاوت  يتلا
 عيمجتلا لئاسو جمد (2)و ؛عيمجلل ةيئاقلتلا وأ ةيرابجلإا ةيطغتلا
 في عونتلا ةدايز كلذكو ،لئاسولا هذه ءاضعأ ددع ةدايزل ةفلتخلما
 معدلا (3) و ؛عمجتلا ءاضعأ ىدل ةيحصلا رطاخلماو تاجايتحلاا
 تاداريلإا  يوذ  نم  ءاضعأ  ابه  يتلا  عيمجتلا  لئاسو  ينب  لدابتلما
 لئاسو  ينب  قيسنتلا  (4)  و  ؛لىعلأا  ةيحصلا  رطاخلماو  لقلأا
 نادلبلل  نكمي  .تلادعلماو  عفدلا  قرطو  ايازلما  لثم  ،عيمجتلا
 ةداعلإ ةيناكمإ دوجو كاردإ نإ .حلاصلإل صرانع ةدع ينب عملجا
 دمتعي  مانإ  ،عيمجتلا  حلاصإ  للاخ  نم  لعفلاب  ققحتت  عيزوتلا
 تاداريلإا  عجم  تابيترتو  ،عيمجتلا  ماظن  ينب  قيسنتلا  لىع  ًاضيأ
 ةيسسؤلما ىودلجاب ديقتي حلاصلإا قاطن نإف ،ةياهنلا فيو .ءاشرلاو
 عيمجتلا  حلاصإب  طبترلما  سيايسلا  داصتقلاا  نأ  ماك  ،ةيسايسلاو
.ةرادلإاو عقوتلا لىإ جاتيح
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支付方式和费率。各国可以结合多种改革要素。是否
能够真正通过统筹改革发挥再分配的潜力还取决于协
调统筹结构与提高收入和购买安排。最后，改革的范
围因体制和政治上的可行性而受到限制 , 需要围绕统
筹改革进行政治经济学方面的预测和管理。
Résumé
Mettre en commun les ressources financières pour la couverture sanitaire universelle: options de réforme
La couverture sanitaire universelle (CSU) consiste à ce que l'ensemble de 
la population ait accès à des services de santé de qualité sans encourir 
de difficultés financières. Pour cela, trois fonctions de financement 
de la santé sont essentielles: le recouvrement des recettes, la mise en 
commun des fonds et l'achat de services de santé. Cet article s'intéresse 
à la mise en commun, à savoir le recueil et la gestion de ressources 
financières prépayées. La mise en commun permet de redistribuer les 
ressources afin d'offrir un accès équitable aux services nécessaires et 
d'améliorer la protection financière même en cas d'impossibilité de 
lever des recettes supplémentaires pour la CSU. Or, dans de nombreux 
pays, les mécanismes de mise en commun sont très fragmentés, ce qui 
fait obstacle à la redistribution. Cet article entend donner un aperçu des 
possibilités de réforme en ce qui concerne la mise en commun afin 
d'aider les pays qui cherchent à améliorer la redistribution des fonds. 
Nous présentons quatre grands types de réforme concernant la mise 
en commun et analysons le potentiel ainsi que les difficultés qu'ils 
présentent pour mettre un terme à la fragmentation du financement 
de la santé: (i) passage à une couverture obligatoire ou automatique 
pour tout le monde; (ii) fusion de différentes caisses afin d'augmenter le 
nombre de membres d'une même caisse ainsi que la diversité de leurs 
besoins et de leurs risques; (iii) interfinancement des caisses dont les 
membres ont des revenus faibles et des risques élevés en matière de 
santé; et (iv) harmonisation entre les caisses concernant, par exemple, 
les avantages, les modes de paiement et les tarifs. Les pays peuvent 
combiner plusieurs éléments de réforme. La réalisation du potentiel de 
redistribution grâce à une réforme de la mise en commun dépend aussi 
de l'alignement de la structure de mise en commun sur le recouvrement 
des recettes et les mécanismes d'achat. Enfin, l'étendue de la réforme 
est limitée par la faisabilité institutionnelle et politique, et l'économie 
politique relative à cette réforme de la mise en commun doit être 
anticipée et gérée.
Резюме
Объединение финансовых ресурсов для достижения всеобщего охвата услугами здравоохранения: 
варианты реформы
Всеобщий охват услугами здравоохранения (ВОУЗ) означает, 
что все люди могут получить доступ к качественным 
медицинским услугам, не испытывая финансовых трудностей. 
Три функции финансирования здравоохранения (сбор доходов, 
объединение средств и приобретение медицинских услуг) 
жизненно необходимы для достижения всеобщего охвата 
услугами здравоохранения. Данная статья посвящена вопросу 
объединения средств — накоплению предоплаченных 
финансовых ресурсов и управлению ими. Объединение 
средств создает возможность перераспределения ресурсов 
для обеспечения равноправного доступа к необходимым 
услугам и дополнительной финансовой защиты, даже если 
дополнительные доходы для достижения всеобщего охвата 
услугами здравоохранения не могут быть собраны. Однако 
во многих странах механизмы объединения средств часто 
разрознены, что создает барьеры для перераспределения. 
Цель данной статьи — предоставить обзор вариантов реформы 
объединения средств с целью оказания поддержки странам, 
которые ищут возможности совершенствования механизмов 
перераспределения средств. Авторы выделяют четыре 
основных типа реформ объединения средств и обсуждают их 
потенциальные возможности и трудности в решении проблемы 
разрозненности финансирования здравоохранения: (i) переход 
на обязательный или автоматический охват услугами для всех 
категорий населения; (ii) объединение различных финансовых 
ресурсов для увеличения количества участников пула средств 
и разнообразия потребностей и рисков для здоровья среди 
участников пула; (iii) перекрестное субсидирование пулов, 
участники которых имеют более низкие доходы и более 
высокие риски для здоровья; (iv) согласование льгот, способов 
оплаты и ставок во всей системе пулов средств. Страны 
могут объединять несколько элементов реформ. Реализация 
потенциальных возможностей перераспределения финансовых 
средств в результате реформы объединения средств также 
зависит от согласования структуры пула с механизмами сбора 
доходов и закупок. Необходимо отметить, что масштабы 
реформы ограничены институциональными и политическими 
возможностями, а политико-экономическая ситуация вокруг 
реформы объединения средств должна быть прогнозируемой 
и управляемой. 
Resumen
Mancomunación de recursos financieros para la cobertura sanitaria universal: opciones para la reforma
La cobertura sanitaria universal (CSU) significa que todas las personas 
pueden acceder a servicios de salud de buena calidad sin experimentar 
dificultades financieras. Hay tres funciones de financiamiento de 
la salud que son fundamentales para la CSU: la recaudación de 
ingresos, la mancomunación de fondos y la compra de servicios de 
salud. Este artículo se centra en la mancomunación: la acumulación y 
gestión de recursos financieros prepagados. La mancomunación crea 
oportunidades para la redistribución de recursos que apoyan el acceso 
equitativo a los servicios necesarios y una mayor protección financiera, 
incluso si no se pueden recaudar ingresos adicionales para la CSU. Sin 
embargo, en muchos países los acuerdos de mancomunación están 
muy fragmentados, lo que crea barreras a la redistribución. El propósito 
de este artículo es proporcionar una visión general de las opciones 
de reforma de la mancomunación para apoyar a los países que están 
explorando formas de mejorar la redistribución de los fondos. Se 
describen cuatro grandes tipos de reformas de mancomunación y se 
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discuten sus potencialidades y desafíos para abordar la fragmentación 
del financiamiento de la salud: (i) pasar a una cobertura obligatoria o 
automática para todos; (ii) fusionar diferentes fondos para aumentar el 
número de miembros del fondo y la diversidad de las necesidades y 
riesgos de salud de los miembros del mismo; (iii) subvención cruzada 
de fondos que tienen miembros con menores ingresos y mayores 
riesgos para la salud; y (iv) armonización entre los fondos, tales como 
beneficios, métodos de pago y tarifas. Los países pueden combinar 
varios elementos de reforma. La realización efectiva del potencial de 
redistribución mediante una reforma de la mancomunación depende 
también de la alineación de la estructura de la mancomunación con los 
acuerdos de recaudación de ingresos y compra. Por último, el alcance 
de la reforma se ve limitado por la viabilidad institucional y política, y es 
preciso anticipar y gestionar la economía política en torno a la reforma 
de la mancomunación.
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